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Abstract 
Axel Hägerström’s axiological nihilism is often taken to render evaluative theories of law impossible: 
if normative statements are incapable of being true or false, there can be no objective basis on which a 
particular law can be judged to be desirable or undesirable, or good or bad. This paper challenges that 
understanding through a reassessment of the theory of legislation formulated by Vilhelm Lundstedt, 
Hägerström’s leading disciple. The reading I present draws not only upon his core theoretical oeuvre, 
but also on his contributions to popular periodicals on questions that were the subject of public debate 
and his later contribution to the debate on the Swedish Law of Sales. When seen in the light of his 
contribution to these debates, his theory of the basis of legislation represents an ingenious attempt to 
overcome the problem of objectivity in law. I defend his approach, and argue that it has much to 
contribute not only to modern theoretical attempts to develop specifically legal theories of objectivity, 
but also to the debate about the role of legal, as distinct from political and moral, argument in the 
evaluation of existing and proposed legislation and the interpretation of contentious legislative texts. 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION: A LEGAL THEORY FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES1 
 
My aim in this article is to defend the theory of legislation put forward by Vilhelm Lundstedt, a leading 
member of the realist movement that blossomed in Scandinavia in the inter-war period. I seek to 
demonstrate that his theory not only remains relevant today, but provides a far better basis for making 
sense of the role legislation plays in modern legal systems than do the approaches that dominate 
contemporary legal theory. Despite the growing importance of legislation, law-making remains at the 
margins of legal theory, as a “particularist” intervention that is fundamentally “political” and hence not 
a proper subject for legal analysis.2 This marginalisation is typically justified in terms of preserving the 
autonomy and coherence of legal analysis; but its result has been to leave us with an incomplete and 
distorted picture of the legal system.3 
In Lundstedt’s work, in contrast, legislation, the manner of its making, and its role in the legal 
process and legal system occupy a central place. Law cannot be understood without understanding how 
and why it is made, and Lundstedt argued that the conceptual apparatus that was and remains the basis 
on which legal theory is built – notions of rights, duties, culpability, responsibility, binding legal rules 
– is fundamentally incapable of contributing anything to our knowledge or understanding of the latter 
question. To understand what legislation is and what its effect is, we must set these to one side and 
focus instead on its social function. This function, he said, is to advance the general social interest by 
promoting what he called samhällsnyttan, loosely, the usefulness of the law to society, or the social 
benefit it provides. All of Lundstedt’s work on legislation – whether critiquing proposed legislation or 
interpreting existing legislation – proceeded on the basis that legislation must be prepared and 
interpreted in the light of the specific social function or use to which it is directed. 
This aspect of Lundstedt’s theory has been rejected almost universally, even by those otherwise 
favourably disposed to Scandinavian legal realism. The chief argument brought against it is that it is 
theoretically inconsistent. Under the received understanding of Scandinavian legal realism, Axel 
Hägerström’s axiological nihilism renders evaluative theories of law impossible. Lundstedt was a 
leading legal exponent of Hägerström’s philosophy; yet in arguing for basing the law on “the needs and 
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interests of society,” he seemed to be making an argument that is inextricably normative and 
evaluative. This was – and continues to be – taken as evidence of his theoretical weakness and political 
prejudices.  
My argument is that this misses two fundamental points about Lundstedt’s theory. I show, in the 
first instance, that his theory as to the social usefulness of legislation was, in essence, a theory about the 
nature of legal discretion, its exercise, and the relationship between interpretive and legislative 
activities. The nature of the discretion implicated in these activities is of central importance to any 
theory that seeks to understand the role and impact of legislation within the legal system. The fact that 
it rarely attracts the attention of legal theorists points to significant lacunae in the manner in which 
legal theory deals with the problem of judicial and legislative discretion in interpretation and 
legislation, which Lundstedt’s theory overcomes. 
Secondly, I show that Lundstedt’s rejection of the traditional conceptual apparatus of legal 
thought is built on a complex theory of the nature of legal knowledge and, hence, of the reality of legal 
concepts. His claim that legislation must be approached from the perspective of its usefulness to 
society was not a normative claim in relation to how legislation ought to be interpreted, as his critics 
assumed, but a descriptive claim as to its nature. This claim has a sound theoretical basis, and has much 
to contribute to our understanding of the law-making process, and the much-contested, but ever 
increasing, role played by “policy” in the law.  
 
 
B. LEGISLATION AND LEGAL THEORY: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Legislation – whether parliamentary or judicial – is, in form, an intervention by a legal authority in the 
operation of an existing and functioning legal system, either through the creation of a new basis for 
adjudication or through the restatement, repeal or amendment of existing ones. The post-legislative task 
of judges and jurists is, accordingly, to integrate these newly framed texts into the framework of the 
functioning legal system. 
Judges and jurists have plenty of tools for this task. Every legal system contains a wealth of “rules” 
or “canons” of interpretation, which cumulatively are capable of providing a conceptual framework for 
the transposition of legislative texts into the adjudicative process and thought-style that underlie the 
functioning of the legal system. The questions thrown up by the transposition of legislation are, 
nevertheless, extremely complex, and it is far from clear how these tools are to be brought to bear or 
with what sort of result. 
A common problem, to which legal theory has no real answer, arises when courts are asked to 
consider the impact of a statute on situations to which it is relevant, but which it does not directly cover, 
as a few examples will illustrate: 
(i) In Marcic v Thames Water,4 a homeowner’s property was repeatedly flooded by raw sewerage. 
He sued the water company responsible for the sewer, which argued that it was excused from liability, 
because its investment, maintenance and upgrade plan had been agreed with the regulator under a 
statutory scheme of regulation. The statute did not consider the relevance of an agreed scheme to the 
rights of private persons. 
(ii) In James Elliot Construction Ltd v Irish Asphalt Ltd,5 a construction product had complied with 
all relevant product standard regulations. It nevertheless caused serious problems when used to build 
houses. The suppliers of the product argued that the fact that they had complied with statutory 
standards meant they had no further liability. Again, the legislation under which the standards were 
prescribed did not consider the impact of compliance with the standards on liability if the product 
turned out to be defective. 
(iii) In Caparo Industries v Dickman,6 the claimant purchased shares in a company relying on its 
audited accounts. The audit turned out to have been negligently carried out. The auditor’s defence was 
that a company’s annual accounts are, under the Companies Act, audited for the purpose of the Annual 
General Meeting only, as a result of which the auditor had no liability whatsoever if the accounts were 
used for any other purpose 
Problem also arise where a statute is clearly applicable to a case, but its scope and meaning are 
unclear, because its drafters did not, and could not have, conceived of the situation where it was 
invoked. Consider the following examples: 
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(i) In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,7 the US judiciary had to consider the question of whether 
they had the jurisdiction to entertain suits for torts committed overseas by multinational corporations 
against foreign nationals. The basis of the claim of jurisdiction was a single, cryptic line in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which gives the courts jurisdiction over claims by an alien “for a tort only in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  
(ii) In R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,8 the UK judiciary 
were faced with the question of whether the British Executive by default has unlimited power to do as 
it pleases in relation to its colonies, by executive fiat and with no constitutional check. The basis of this 
claim – made in that case by the British government – was a provision in the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865 to the effect that no law made in relation to a colony can be struck down “on the ground of 
repugnancy to the law of England” unless it was repugnant to an Act of Parliament. The statute’s main 
focus was the relatively narrow question of the extent to which the governments of British colonies 
could change principles of common law to suit local conditions but, due to its wording, it came to be 
the principal authority in a case involving a very different question. 
Cases such as these are difficult, because they raise fundamental questions in relation to the effect 
of legislative participation in the process by which the legal system develops and the weight, meaning 
and significance of legislation for the legal system. They are not, however, exceptional – they represent 
a type of issue that modern legal systems face with growing frequency, as the requirements imposed by 
the regulatory state increasingly influence the ways in which parties behave or are expected to behave. 
Yet legal theory tells us curiously little about the actual mechanics by which courts deal with the 
problems of interpretation that such cases create. It is not that legal theory ignores the role played by 
interpretation – many legal theorists give the interpretive process a central place in their theories. The 
trouble, however, is that theorists rarely attempt to shed any light on the nature of the grammar or 
thought-style that underlies the interpretive process. Karl Llewellyn pointed out over half a century ago 
that it is far from clear how different rules on the interpretation of statutes fit together or what guides 
the choice of one rule over another.9 Today, the question remains unanswered, and many theorists go to 
the extent of denying its relevance or importance.10 Judges choose rules pragmatically, they argue, 
based on the relative weight of the various criteria they are called upon to apply, and there is no 
fundamental flaw in their doing so. Jurists need not, therefore, concern themselves unduly with 
attempting to describe the ways in which judges make these choices, or with attempting to discern or 
outline a single set of patterns or principles underlying them. 
This lack of interest reflects a broader decline in the role of description in legal scholarship – a 
trend which stands in stark contrast to the fundamental premises of legal realism, and which Anne 
Orford has recently argued is linked to the growing emphasis on the use of philosophers as “authorities 
on justice or truth.”11 Legislation presents the theorist not with ideas – as case law or open-textured 
provisions do – but with texts framed in the form of legal rules. This form, of its nature, detaches the 
text from the specific facts and imperatives of policy or principle that prompted it. As a result it is hard 
to impute to the text the justificatory bases that legal theory imputes to law derived from other sources, 
such as open-textured codes, case law, custom, or unwritten principles. Understanding legislation, its 
making, and its impact requires a level of descriptive analysis and research for which metaphysically 
oriented theories have little room. 
This is not to say that legislation is ignored altogether, but its role is nevertheless marginal in 
virtually every area of legal theory. Ronald Dworkin famously denied that legislation could exert 
spreading effects – a “pull,” as he termed it – on surrounding areas of law, as case-law could, and 
statutes (apart from constitutional legislation) are conspicuously absent in the sources he uses to derive 
his account of political morality. This is part of a broader pattern. Idealist theories of law in general 
tend to focus on the open-textured provisions of codes, or on morally oriented strands of case law, 
rather than the nitty-gritties of more specifically-focused legislation. Similarly, despite the centrality of 
codes to the comparative project, the body of comparative scholarship on statutory interpretation is 
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vanishingly small.12 Yet to push legislation to the margins is to present a picture of the legal system 
that is at best distorted and at worst wholly misleading. Even in an area of law as central to the legal 
system as private law, the impact of legislation – in addition to leading cases and open-textured 
provisions of codes – has been so significant and so sustained that the shape of the law cannot be 
understood without it.13 
Lundstedt argued that these problems in legal theory are not incidental or minor, but reflect 
structural problems in jurisprudence and the analytical frameworks in which legal theory 
conventionally deals – and, in particular, point to the absence of an understanding in legal theory of the 
nature of the task of making and applying legislation. Much of modern legal theory draws a distinction 
between legislation and the judicial interpretation of law. “Faithful” interpretation, in these theories, is 
distinguished by its “groundedness” in the principles or concepts that these theories hold to be the 
constitutive essence of the law – whether that be “corrective justice,” “rights,” “political morality” and 
“fit,” or some other concept. Any form of judicial engagement with the law that is not so grounded is 
treated as being “judicial legislation,” beyond the pale of what a judge should properly do. 
Lundstedt’s theory, in contrast, begins with a rejection of the traditional distinction between 
“interpretation” and “legislation”. Much like modern sceptical or critical theorists, Lundstedt argued 
that interpretation by judges in cases where written and unwritten law do not point to a clear and 
unequivocal result is a form of legislation, because a judge who articulates a new interpretation 
articulates something that did not previously form part of the practice of the courts or other authorities 
in the legal system.14 Yet, unlike modern-day sceptical theorists, Lundstedt did not thereby imply that 
the adjudicative process is characterised by complete subjectivity, or an absence of groundedness. 
Instead, by linking parliamentary and judicial legislation, Lundstedt sought to make the point that both 
judicial and parliamentary legislation are grounded in the same thing – namely, conceptions as to its 
social usefulness and social functions – because legislation of its very nature is concerned with being, 
in some way, useful to society or with fulfilling definite social purposes and functions.15 
In this, Lundstedt’s theory of legislation departs quite fundamentally from more conventional 
theories. Modern legal approaches to legislation for the most part do not seek to formulate general 
theories as to its nature. They focus, instead, on its form, and seek to devise ways of interpreting or 
giving content to legislation, or determining its relevance to a particular fact situation, purely from the 
words used in it, or from the context in which or purpose for which it was made. If they define 
legislation, they do so in procedural terms – as a document that has obtained the imprimatur of the 
legislative branch of government, after following a particular process that is seen as sufficient for the 
purpose of conferring that imprimatur. 
A procedural definition of this sort, however, is incapable of shedding light on the character of the 
interaction between legislation and the legal system. Doing so requires a substantive understanding of 
the nature, character and weight of legislation, and of how it seeks to influence the legal system. The 
central claim of Lundstedt’s theory is that this requires theorists to take into account the social benefit a 
law provides, or the social usefulness its maintenance serves, because these are the factors upon which 
the activity of legislation is based. As we will see, examining how legislation implicates and is 
implicated in the exercise of discretion by legal actors lends considerable support to Lundstedt’s claim.  
 
 
C. LEGAL DISCRETION AND THE NATURE OF LEGISLATION 
 
Legislation is, principally, directed to constraining or directing the discretion of legal actors. The terms 
in which statutes are phrased are conceptual and general, in the same way as the rules found in codes or 
in the “principles” of the common law: legislation, like law generally, is framed in conceptual terms – 
“reasonable,” “treasonous” – and in the form of rules. The concepts embedded in legislation affect 
those embedded in an existing legal system in three ways. Firstly, legislation may alter the intension – 
or “sense” – of a concept by changing the criteria that determine whether a particular situation falls 
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within or outwith a concept. Secondly, it may alter the extension – or denotation – of a concept by 
directly specifying that certain situations will – or will no longer – be treated as falling within a concept. 
Finally, it may alter the effect or consequence that follows from a particular situation being classified 
as falling within a concept. 
The UK’s Compensation Act 2006 is a good example of a statute which, in successive provisions, 
does all three of these. s. 1 of the statute speaks to the intension of the concept of a duty of care, by 
specifying that the deterrent effect a duty might have should be one of the considerations that influence 
the answer to the question of whether or not a duty exists in a particular case. ss. 2 and 3 of the statute 
alter the extension of two concepts – the first, the concept of an “admission” of liability, by providing 
that certain types of offers will not be regarded as admissions, and the second the concept of 
“proportionate liability,” by providing that that concept will no longer apply to certain types of 
situations involving the causation of mesothelioma through negligent exposure to asbestos. The next 
sections of the statute alter the consequences of an entity’s activities being classified as “claims 
management” by creating a new framework to regulate those activities. 
In each of these cases, the principal goal and effect of so altering concepts is to impose constraints 
upon the discretion of judges or other legal actors. This is as true of judicial legislation as it is of 
legislation by a parliament. It is not difficult to find cases in which appellate judges, in their 
restatement of the law, expressly attempt to set out the factors that judges in lower courts should or 
should not take into account, particularly when overruling a line of authorities or when seeking to lay 
down the outlines of a new approach. The impact of legislation is either case is to alter the manner in 
which the legal system develops or functions, either by altering the manner in which it is interpreted or 
implemented or by freezing the development of the law by closing off certain paths which its 
development might otherwise have taken. This is also true of what is sometimes, misleadingly, called 
“symbolic” legislation. Symbolic legislation is rarely purely symbolic: by setting down in legislative 
form an aspect of the intension a court currently gives a legal concept, or the situations covered by the 
concept or the consequences of a situation so being covered, the lawmaker restricts the ability of judges 
to move these concepts along – as is the case more generally with any legislation that attempts to 
emulate the form and conceptual framework of judicial reasoning. 
The fundamental question for an interpreter is, therefore, to assess how far-reaching or wide-
ranging the effect of these constraints is to be taken to be. What, when seen from within the legal 
system, is the place, effect, weight and significance of legislative participation in the ongoing 
development of the legal system? How do the words in which the instrument that effects this 
participation is framed affect, alter, or reshape that process of the law’s development? 
The relationship between the answers to these questions and the nature of legislation can be seen 
with reference to the analogy of the chain novel, which has repeatedly featured in legal debates about 
interpretation. Ronald Dworkin, writing in the late 1980s, presented an analogy between interpretation 
and the writing of a chain novel. A person late in the chain, Dworkin argued, would be constrained by 
the work done by those who have gone before.16 Yet this analogy is incomplete in an important respect. 
A subsequent entrant to the chain is not, in any coercive sense, bound to continue writing the chain 
novel in the spirit of the original – and, in point of fact, the actual writing of chain novels in internet-
based projects to produce “crowdsourced” texts have shown that participants do not always feel 
themselves so bound. A particularly striking example is the result of the “A Million Penguins” project 
launched by Penguin Books in 2007, to produce a collaboratively written novel. The result showed a 
range of different types of participants, ranging from those who sought to use it to “showcase their 
talents,” to those who sought to nurture it for its own sake, and those who participated with a view to 
ruining it.17 
This is not to adopt the sceptical position that judges are not under any real constraints in the 
manner in which they interpret texts. It is, rather, to point out that there is another dimension to 
discretion – which theorists of discretion refer to as its “internal” dimension 18  – which plays a 
significant role in augmenting the relatively weak constraints imposed by a text alone. One aspect of 
the internal dimension of discretion that has received some attention in the literature are the constraints 
placed on a judge by the existence of a multiplicity of actors in the legal arena, whose responses he or 
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she will need to consider.19 Lundstedt, however, points to a far more fundamental constraint. To return 
to the analogy of the chain novel, subsequent entrants in the process of producing a chain novel or a 
crowdsourced novel have discretion in relation to whether or not to regard themselves as bound or 
constrained by what has gone before. The manner in which they exercise that discretion – whether they 
choose to continue the novel in the spirit in which it has been written until then, or introduce a radical 
twist that alters its essential character – depends on how they view the enterprise in which they are 
participating. Understanding how they view the enterprise must, therefore, be an essential part of any 
attempt to understand the process by which the chain novel is produced. 
This was the basis of Lundstedt’s critique of legal theory in his day, and it resonates even more 
strongly today. The making of legislation as well as its interpretation and application are purposive 
activities or enterprises, Lundstedt argued. No enterprise can proceed without some sense of what the 
enterprise is seeking to do, and no description of that enterprise intended to further it can proceed 
without engaging with the question of the nature of the enterprise. So it is with legislation. 
Although Lundstedt did not phrase it in these terms, his argument was, in effect, that any judge 
faced with a legislative text has discretion in relation to how he chooses to engage with that text, much 
like any other interpreter faced with any type of text. The text itself is an external constraint on this 
discretion, but it is a rather weak one because of the room that rules of construction give to judges. 
Additionally, because legislation typically has a transformative aim, it is harder to understand it in 
terms of the pre-legislative content of those concepts – we must, necessarily, engage with the question 
of what legislation has done to those concepts, and we cannot rationally do that unless we look beyond 
them. The internal constraints on discretion – represented by the enterprise in which judges see 
themselves as being engaged when working with legislation, or, in other words, what they see the 
nature of legislation as being within the context of the functioning of the legal system – are in 
consequence of far more relevance. 
What applies to judges as legislators applies equally to parliamentarians or administrators acting as 
legislators. One of the remarkable aspects of much of modern legal theory is the reluctance of theorists 
to treat the discretion of parliamentary legislators as being in any way constrained in relation to their 
activity – implicit in, for example, the absence of any serious theory within law of the nature of the 
discretion involved – whilst being at the same time reluctant to treat the discretion of judicial officials 
as being in any way unconstrained. It is hard to resist the conclusion that this is a reflection of the 
continued hold which the will theory of legislation – as a relic of Hobbesian and Austinian 
positivism20 – continues to exercise over jurists. Even theorists quite far removed from positivism – 
such as Ronald Dworkin – tend to view legislation as being something different from, and exterior to, 
the “usual” sources of political morality: it can “introduce” principles of political morality into the law, 
seemingly without being constrained by them, in sharp contrast to cases, which “develop” and “refine” 
those principles while being constrained by them. 
Yet this view of legislation is hard to sustain. It is true that most legal system impose few external 
constraints on the ability of parliaments to legislate. The principal restrictions are constitutional 
“charters of rights” and procedural requirements (such as the requirement of a special majority for 
certain types of legislation or the procedural rules of the US Senate that give a minority of senators the 
ability to defeat legislation through a “filibuster”). Apart from these loose fetters, parliamentarians are 
not bound to legislate in a manner that “carries out the law”.21 To confine oneself to these, however, is 
to ignore the internal element of constraints on discretion. Parliamentary legislators are not despots in 
modern legal systems nor are they any more likely to act capriciously than judges are; but to depict 
them as essentially untrammelled by any form of discretion is to posit precisely that. If we accept that 
parliamentarians are also guided by certain considerations in the exercise of their discretion – that, in 
other words, their discretion, too, is constrained by an internal dimension – then we must, necessarily, 
investigate what the contours of that dimension are if we seek to understand the phenomenon of 
legislation in the real world. 
This, then, is the question to which Lundstedt’s much-derided conception of “social usefulness” 
was the answer. “Social usefulness,” or samhällsnyttan, is in modern terms an aspect of the internal 
component of discretion, which affects both parliamentarians and judges because it represents the 
understanding of the nature of legislation (and, more broadly, of law) on which actors within legal 
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system base their reception of and engagement with legislation. A legislator making a law is embedded 
within existing and functioning legal, social and economic systems, and is aware of this when 
legislating. This awareness does not act as an external constraint on what a lawmaker may do – a 
sovereign Parliament such as the United Kingdom’s may under the British constitution validly make a 
law that ignores these constraints, much as a judge of the highest court may choose to ignore precedent. 
In practice, they do not do so, because the internal component of their discretion – which, in turn, 
represents an embodiment of a conception of social usefulness – emphasises its importance. The failure 
to take account of its existence and significance is responsible for the inability of legal theory to deal 
with the role of legislation within the legal system, and for the seeming randomness of judicial 
approaches to legislation. 
 
 
D. SOCIAL BENEFIT AND THE MACHINERY OF LAW 
 
We can, now, move to assessing the validity of Lundstedt’s theory. Can we, with any degree of 
confidence, say that this notion of social usefulness is, in fact, a fair description of the internal 
dimension of discretion, and, as such, of an important set of conditions that guides the manner in which 
legal actors make and otherwise engage with legislation?  
Lundstedt’s insistence that legislation reflected social utility baffled many of his contemporaries 
and later theorists. On the one hand, Lundstedt – like Hägerström – criticised rights, duties and similar 
conceptions as being subjective, grounded in superstition, and having no basis in reality. How was 
“social usefulness” any different? Surely the notion of social usefulness was every bit as subjective and 
metaphysical as the notion of a right? And, given the sordid realities and limitations of the processes by 
which legislation emerges – regardless of whether the makers are parliamentarians22 or judges23 – how 
can a realist justifiably say that laws necessarily reflect and advance social goals, rather than the 
interests of whichever special interest group happened to have the most influence on the law-making 
process? Even granted that there is an internal component to a lawmaker’s discretion, why is “social 
usefulness” a valid description of the basis on which that discretion is exercised when “respect for 
rights” is not? 
These points lay at the heart of Alf Ross’s attack on Lundstedt, which he launched through two 
articles in the Svensk juristtidning in 1932 and 1933.24 “Social usefulness,” Ross argued, was every bit 
as metaphysical and “chimeral” (a phrase Lundstedt frequently used in relation to theories he opposed) 
as rights. This could well be the basis for constructing a pragmatic metaphysics, as Bentham and the 
utilitarians had tried to do. But it was a far cry from the rational jurisprudence Hägerström had sought 
to erect, and which Lundstedt claimed to espouse. 
Lundstedt’s reply was complex. The idea of social usefulness he put forward, he said, was not a 
general principle nor did it represent an objective value. Instead, it represented the manner in which 
persons making the law were influenced by, and directed their actions towards, the conditions of the 
society to which their law-making activities relate, and the goals which persons forming part of that 
society strove to attain. Ideas such as rights, in contrast, were of their nature incapable of describing the 
nature or content of influences on law-making. 
Let us take this argument in two parts, starting, first, with Lundstedt’s claim that legislation can 
objectively be said to be directed towards social usefulness, and then proceeding to his claim that rights 
cannot be objective. What is the nature of the claim Lundstedt was making when he stated that 
legislation was based on the idea of providing some form of social benefit, or social usefulness? As his 
critics then and now interpreted it, Lundstedt was in essence making a normative claim as to how 
lawmakers ought to make legislation, and how judges ought to decide cases. This claim, they argue, is 
no different from the claim that legislation should be approached from the perspective of “natural 
rights” or “the legislative will”. Lundstedt, in this reading, was so blinded by his social-democratic 
prejudices – and by the inadequacy of his own understanding – that, notwithstanding his espousal of 
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Hägerström’s anti-metaphysical teachings, he was unable to see how his own work exhibited the very 
qualities Hägerström had criticised.25 
This reading has been persuasive, but it is based on a misunderstanding of Lundstedt’s claims. 
Lundstedt himself insisted that his argument as to the centrality of an understanding of the usefulness 
of a law to society was descriptive, not normative. Social benefit in his theory was, he emphasised, not 
an abstract principle that could be assessed through a simple calculus, as it was in the theories of the 
utilitarians. Instead, it represented an evaluation of what might be useful to members of a given society, 
against the background of their way of life and their “aspirations and struggles” at a given point of time. 
This involved the encouragement of the things that members of that society actually strive for, not the 
things that a philosopher believed they ought to strive for. Laws favour social utility if their consistent 
operation furthers these goals. But whether something actually furthers these goals – and, hence is 
socially useful, in turn, cannot be determined save with reference to the actual conditions in a given 
society. A market-economy and a planned economy function in very different ways, and what is 
socially useful in one will not necessarily be so in another. The question of social usefulness must, 
therefore, be examined against the backdrop of the structure of a society, including its power-relations, 
and it is this determination that is, ultimately, the basis of all activity connected with legislation, 
including law-making and interpretation. 26 
Lundstedt’s claim that his theory of social usefulness was founded on an empirical claim as to the 
nature of legislation, and not a metaphysical claim as to the law’s content or justificatory basis does, 
prima facie, have substance. Lundstedt followed Hägerström in frequently describing the law as a 
machine. To say that a machine has a function is neither subjective nor metaphysical: the statement “a 
bicycle is a machine whose purpose (or function) is to transport its rider” is patently both descriptive 
and objective. And whilst the fact that the legal system can metaphorically be called a “machine” does 
not necessarily support the proposition that it has a “function,” or that “social usefulness” is a valid 
description of that function, Lundstedt’s proposition receives considerable support from modern 
institutional theory. 
In Lundstedt’s work the suggestion that law can be likened to a machine is not merely a 
convenient metaphor. When he sought to explain the differences between him and the American 
Realists in Legal Thinking Revised – his last book, in which he tried to present a final and complete 
account of his legal theory – he repeatedly returned to the fact that his theory incorporated an account 
of the functioning of “the legal machinery,” and roughly half the book is devoted to setting out the role 
and functioning of the legal machinery. As Patricia Mindus has shown in a recent essay on 
Hägerström’s use of the analogy, social changes since the two world wars of the twentieth century have 
radically altered the way we view machinery with the result that the point Hägerström (and Lundstedt) 
sought to make is generally missed.27 Mindus argues that Hägerström’s use of this figure has three 
dimensions, which taken together encapsulate his rejection of the transcendental idealism of natural 
law theories as well as the (equally transcendental) intentionalism of will-based theories of law – 
namely, that law is a human creation but at the same time not a reflection of any one individual’s will 
in that the law that exists at any point of time is the result of an evolutionary process in which many 
individuals have participated; that law is a social system which incorporates and shapes the actions of 
legal officials and that consequently cannot simply be reduced to what legal actors such as judges do; 
and finally that law is a social technique, created to facilitate and shape social interaction. 
The three dimensions identified by Mindus point to a far more substantive set of ideas lying 
behind the conceptualisation of the law as a machine than is traditionally assumed. These 
characteristics closely parallel what modern institutional theorists would call an “institution.” 
Lundstedt himself seems, in his English writing, to have used these terms interchangeably, and the 
manner in which he (and Hägerström) use the image of legal machinery is much more intelligible today 
if we replace “machinery” with “institution”. In institutional theory, an institution is a set of 
constraints – formal rules, informal norms, or conventions – which operate on a group of people and 
affect the manner in which they act or behave, and which are created in response to real or threatened 
conflicts between the social expectations of several people.28 Institutions are, as institutional theory 
tells us, the products of deliberate human action, and are expressly created to shape social interaction, 
but change considerably over time as the social context in which they operate, the uses to which they 
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are put, and the groups of actors affected by their operation change.29 As institutional theorists have 
noted, this means that institutions have a function, which is a social function and is not reducible to any 
single will, much as Lundstedt claimed. Equally, concepts such as “rights” are at best what John Searle 
has called “institutional facts,” which are the products of the operation of institutions, not their cause – 
again, precisely as Lundstedt claimed. And, finally, the creation and operation of institutions is always 
oriented towards meeting some need arising out of social interaction – a formulation that is remarkably 
similar to Lundstedt’s account of law as being a mechanism defined by its usefulness in pursuing social 
goals. 
 
 
 
E. LEGAL IDEOLOGY, SOCIAL UTILITY, AND OBJECTIVE LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
Lundstedt did not stop at saying that social usefulness was a way of understanding legislation. He went 
further, arguing that legislation and law could only be understood in terms of social usefulness. He 
opposed, in particular, the proposition that legislation sometimes protected rights. Rights were, as a 
concept, so fundamentally flawed that they were incapable of constituting the basis of legislation. It 
was, even as a descriptive matter, wrong to say that, for example, legislation concerning 
misappropriation of trust funds is aimed at protecting the beneficiary’s “right” to the funds. 
The best place to begin considering what distinguishes “rights” from “social usefulness” is the 
debate between Lundstedt and Ingemar Hedenius, a philosopher who was also broadly associated with 
the realist movement in Scandinavia and who had a deep influence on Swedish jurisprudence. In 1941, 
Hedenius published a book called Om rätt och moral (“Of law and morals”), around a third of which 
was taken up by a section titled “Det Hägerström-Lundstedtska misstaget” (“The Hägerström-
Lundstedt error”), which presented an extended critique of Hägerström and Lundstedt’s views on law. 
Hedenius began by taking an example deliberately chosen to resemble Hägerström’s assertion that 
the idea of a “right” was grounded in Graeco-Roman superstition. Consider, Hedenius said, rain. The 
Classical Greek word for “It is raining” was “hyei.” A Greek who said “hyei” meant the same thing as a 
Swede who said “det regnar” or an Englishman who said “it is raining.” Now, Hedenius said, the 
ancient Greeks believed that rain was the result of Zeus strewing water over the Earth. This was clearly 
wrong. However, when a Greek said “hyei” he still meant that waterdrops were falling from the 
heavens onto the Earth, and his words therefore described a real phenomenon, even if his conception of 
rain was wholly fantastic and even if he believed that he was talking about a different and much more 
complex process. 
The same principle, Hedenius argued, applied to “rights” and other core concepts in jurisprudence. 
Hägerström may well have been correct in his assertion that the concept of a “right” in origin was 
clouded in superstition. It might even be that people’s personal conceptions of rights were riddled with 
superstitious beliefs. This, however, did not alter the fact that when people spoke of legal rights, 
whatever the philosophical problems with the underlying concept itself might be, they were referring to 
something real – namely, that if certain factual criteria were satisfied, the state machinery would react 
in a particular way. To say, as Hägerström and Lundstedt did, that rights could not have any real 
existence because the notion of rights had its roots in superstition ignored the fact that the term “rights” 
as a legal term described real facts and real relations. The right to property, for example, was an 
aggregation of a number of hypothetical facts, whose components included restitution, compensation, 
punishment, and so on. The alleged problems pointed to by Lundstedt and Hägerström were no 
different from the conceptual problems created by a statement such as “My, how the time has flown,” 
and were just as capable of referring to factual realities.30 
In framing the problem in these terms, Hedenius was taking his cue from Adolph Phalén, who is 
generally taken to have been, with Hägerström, the joint founder of the so-called Uppsala school of 
philosophy. All theoretical and philosophical concepts, Phalén said, ultimately derive their meanings 
from the manner in which the relevant term is used in common, everyday usage. As time passes, 
however, these concepts come to be riddled with contradictions. The task of philosophy is to identify 
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and resolve these, and through so doing to contribute to the concept’s development. 31 This, in essence, 
is what Hedenius sought to do in relation to law. 
In Hägerström’s theory, however this basic insight received a new form. Well before he and Phalén 
founded the Uppsala school of philosophy, Hägerström had begun to investigate a basic 
epistemological question which was the foundation of his critique of moral reasoning: how can we 
acquire knowledge, and of what can we acquire knowledge? Legal theorists such as Dworkin have 
tended to assume that theories which reject the reality of moral statements are built on a 
correspondence theory of reality. The foundation of Hägerström’s theory is however in the idea of 
contradiction.32 The acquisition of factual knowledge, Hägerström argued, entails gathering empirical 
data as well as making a judgment on the data through rational thought. An important aspect of the way 
in which we identify conceptions as being true or false, over and above their internal consistency, is 
their consistency with other conceptions which we know to be true. We can, thus, assess the conception 
“men who breathe through gills” to be incompatible with the conception “men who breathe through 
lungs,” in that they cannot exist in the same world.33 We know that the latter is a conception grounded 
in the real world, which implies, necessarily, that the former is false. A conception where such a 
comparison is not possible is, therefore, incapable of being true or false, because it has no real-world 
referrents we can use to judge its truth or falsity – it is, to put it differently, not representational. It is 
the absence of a representational character that makes statements incapable of being true or false in 
Hägerström’s theory, not the fact that they have an axiological or normative element – and, indeed, 
both Hägerström and Lundstedt admitted quite freely that law had a normative element, and was 
connected with the enterprise of prescribing how people ought to behave.34 Equally, because it is only 
conceptions grounded in the spatio-temporal world that can form the basis of any such comparison, it is 
only such conceptions that can ground the possibility of any form of knowledge.35 
The same insight, Hägerström said, applies equally to legal knowledge in all its forms.36 Consider 
the statement: 
 
 “The sky is blue” 
 
Here the adjectival predicate following the copula is the conception “blue”. Following Frege’s method, 
this can be replaced with its real world referent, thus yielding the formulation in relation to a person 
with normal vision: 
 
“The sky is perceived as having a visual appearance corresponding to a segment of the 
electromagnetic spectrum having a wavelength between 474–476 nm” 
 
Given the veracity of this statement with reference to the spatio-temporal world, we can assess the 
validity of the following conception: 
 
 “The sky is mustard yellow” 
 
and reject its truth on the basis of its incompatibility with the first.37 
Crucially, however, this exercise involves two dimensions of fit, the first relating to internal fit – 
the self-consistency of the complex of conceptions represented by the statement itself, which it passes – 
and the second to the fit of the statement with things external to itself – i.e., the consistency of the 
complex of conceptions represented by this statement with the external, spatio-temporal world, which it 
fails. It is the latter that is absent in legal theory that is based on rights, positivism, or the other concepts 
that have traditionally formed its basis. In relation to law, the element of external fit can only come 
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from an understanding of the actual nature of legislation – the act that is the origin of the law – and of 
the evaluative judgments that go into its making, not from fictional constructs that by virtue of being 
fictions do not exist in the spatio-temporal world.38 Consider the following statement (an example cited 
by Dworkin): 
 
 “Slavery is unjust” 
 
Here, the predicate following the copula – “unjust” – can neither be reduced to a real-world 
phenomenon, nor can it be compared to one. Taken by itself, therefore, it is incapable of being true or 
false, and the mere fact that the individual making it is absolutely convinced that it is true does not 
change its essential character. It can, potentially, be given content and truth-validity if we define 
“unjust” to mean “contrary to settled law” – as Hedenius suggested we could39 – but doing so makes 
the concept a result of the operation of the legal system, which is unhelpful if our task is to deal with 
cases to which existing law does not speak. As such, the concept “unjust” cannot in and of itself 
provide an interpretive principle. 
Hägerström’s theory thus implies that internal fit – a concept that lies at the heart of much of 
modern legal theory – cannot by itself be of any assistance in dealing with legislation, because internal 
fit is epistemologically insufficient without the added dimension of external fit. In an early course of 
lectures, Hägerström presented a critique of Hegel’s subjective naturalism. This, he said, permitted the 
construction of elaborate worlds based on concepts that were entirely false because they did not reflect 
reality.40 Much the same can be said of theories of law that rely solely on internal fit.  
Paradoxically, therefore, the failure of legal theorists to deal with the spatio-temporal 
considerations that constitute the internal dimension of discretion leads to their being unable to deal 
with the external dimension of fit. The result is to leave their theories crippled when it comes to dealing 
with the questions thrown up by legislation. Take, by way of example, the question with which section 
B began. On what basis can we say that a particular reading of legislation is right or wrong, or better or 
worse? Thus, for example, in Marcic v Thames Water – discussed in section B – the House of Lords 
accepted a form of pre-emption of the law of tort by regulation, holding in effect that a regulatory 
framework of the type implicated in that case implicitly excluded remedies in tort even if it purports 
not to.41 On what basis can we decide whether this can be said to be a wrong reading, or a worse 
reading, of the relevant legislation? Bare, ungrounded conceptualism cannot give us the answer, nor 
can variants of “fit” that are purely internally determined, because neither is grounded in the spatio-
temporal world. 
Lundstedt’s critique also implies that the result of basing engagement with legislation on things 
that are not real in the spatio-temporal sense is to give free rein to legal ideology, with consequences 
that are fundamentally undesirable for the legal system as a whole. 42  Consider again Dworkin’s 
example of the statement “Slavery is unjust.” In an emotivist reading, such as the one Hägerström and 
Lundstedt adopted, it might be capable of being seen as giving expression to the sentiment: 
 
“The failure of the State to act against slavery produces in me emotions of anger and 
dissatisfaction.” 
 
which may well be true if it is an accurate description of the internal emotions of the speaker. As a 
referent to external reality, however, it is incapable of being either true or false. Lundstedt’s theory 
goes further. In legal discourse, Lundstedt pointed out, a person making a claim that an action or 
situation is “unjust,” or that it is “unlawful,” or that it “breaches a right” is making a claim in relation to 
the outcomes that the operation of the legal system produces. In consequence, they can and do refer to 
some form of reality, and are in essence an ideological layer superimposed over these realities, which 
they disguise. 43  What, then, are these realities? The real-world phenomenon in each case is an 
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evaluative decision in relation to the outcomes that the operation of the legal system produces – which, 
by definition, relates to the goals the legal system pursues and how it pursues those goals. Regardless 
of what legal ideology might say, it is therefore ultimately the law’s social function that motivates the 
making of legislation by judges and parliamentarians.44 Because, to use his metaphor, “the demands of 
[the law’s] social uses are too strong to be refused,” these burst through the constructs erected by legal 
ideology.45 
Lundstedt gave the example of the law of property. A property “right,” he said, is the result of the 
operation of the legal system, and not its cause. The reason a person can assert that he has a property 
“right” is because the law systematically defines his legal position vis-à-vis others in a manner that lets 
him maintain actions against them under the laws of trespass, conversion, trust, nuisance, alienation 
and so on, but also through the rules of criminal law concerned with theft, embezzlement and similar 
matters.46 His “right,” therefore, cannot form the basis of the law. The same is true of ideas such as 
general feelings of justice in society – these, too, are the products of the existence of a legal system, 
and of social conceptions as to what the legal system does. They serve the ends of the legal system 
once they come into existence, but they are nevertheless its effects rather than its causes.47 
At one level, this view of legislation assumes a certain element of uncorrupted civic virtue in the 
political process through the participation of what Lundstedt called ‘enlightened lawmakers.’ Lundstedt 
has been criticised as being “naïve” for having made this assumption, but as his work shows, he did not, 
in fact, assume that that civic virtue would always animate legislators and adjudicators. Part of the 
jurist’s role in his theory is to highlight situations where legislation and adjudication did not in fact 
work to the benefit of society, and much of Lundstedt’s work was devoted to excoriating legislators 
and jurists for failing to take broader social interests into account.48 More fundamentally, the fact that 
law-making can and does function in the interests of a particular section of society does not affect the 
validity of his thesis. Returning to the analogy with a machine, whilst machines can break down, we 
can still describe how a well-functioning machine would work, and indeed, doing so is an essential 
scholarly activity. It is hardly metaphysical to say “greasing a bicycle’s chain with treacle is bad for the 
bicycle.” Equally, there is much in this aspect of Lundstedt’s work that is corroborated by recent 
anthropological research on “legal consciousness,” and in particular on the manner in which 
constructions of legality and expectations as to how the law will react influence social interaction. 49  
 
 
F. THE METHOD OF SOCIAL USEFULNESS 
 
How, then, can we actually use the concept of social usefulness to interpret or describe the law? 
Contrary to the view one frequently sees in Anglo-American sources, Lundstedt did not reject all 
conceptual thinking. He admitted it would be difficult to discuss the content of the law without drawing 
upon rights, duties and similar conceptions as descriptive categories50 – a point that, regrettably, has 
been systematically missed by English-language commentators on Lundstedt, who have in 
consequence accused him of failing to appreciate the difference between naming and meaning and of 
ignoring the “functional use” of words.  
Nevertheless, these concepts are not – and cannot be – the basis of legislation, because they are, 
inherently, the result of the operation of legislation. Construing the basis of the law involves setting 
these descriptive categories to one side, and instead examining the results of the operation of the law 
against the backdrop of the society in which it operates and the power relations reflected in that society. 
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The starting point is to ask the counterfactual question: what would this society look like were it not for 
this particular complex of laws? 
Lundstedt used this method to analyse the law of property. Its base lies in the fact that it is 
“particularly desirable” for people in Western societies to “command things, have them at one’s 
disposal, use and thus to exploit them,” and in the consequent role the “prospect of acquiring 
possession of things” that are sought after plays in encouraging productive work.51 The question of 
what the law of property actually protects must, therefore, be answered by examining the consequences 
of the operation of property law against the background of these goals. Looking at the Swedish law of 
sales, Lundstedt argued that its true base was the (social) need of giving individuals the ability to 
engage in risk-free transactions in property – without, in other words, the risk of a legal intervention to 
disrupt the transaction, or the risk of the other side unilaterally engaging in loss-causing conduct – and 
to protect the security of holdings, both of which cumulatively furthered the goals he had identified.52 
It is notable that Lundstedt here uses the notion “desirable” – which, on its face, would seem to be 
metaphysical. Lundstedt was not unaware of this, but he argued that this did not render his theories 
metaphysical in the same way that rights-based theories were. The fact that value-judgments cannot be 
true or false does not mean that they are all equal. Returning to the distinction Hägerström drew 
between conceptions that are representational (and hence capable of being true or false) and those that 
are not (and hence neither true nor false), Lundstedt argued that whereas the conception “a property 
right” cannot refer to anything outside the legal system – and hence cannot be representational of 
anything that can constitute the base of the legal system – the conception “the things Swedes strive to 
gain” can and does refer to something that has objective existence external to the conception. That 
thing may well be a feeling or the product of an emotion-based evaluation, but the existence of that 
feeling amongst the general public is, nevertheless, an objective fact.53 There are challenges associated 
with ascertaining this objective fact, with overcoming the cognitive biases that can lead a legislator to 
mistake his or her feelings for the feelings of the general public, and with determining how these goals 
are best served. But resolving these, Lundstedt argued, was the task of jurists. His aim was not to 
eliminate jurisprudence with a simple test (an “Open Sesame,” as he put it), but to more clearly define 
what its tasks for succeeding generations were.54 
The language of ideology obfuscates this, making the task of interpretation and legislation far 
more complex than it needs to be. Lundstedt took the example of a single section in the Swedish Law 
of Sales of 1905 (Köplagen 1905:38, since replaced by Köplagen 1990:931), dealing with liability in 
relation to events beyond the control of a party. The traditional interpretation, Lundstedt said, treated 
this as dealing with situations of “objective impossibility,” but this left the section too broad, with the 
consequence that jurists had to invent new doctrines – such as the doctrine of implied guarantee – in 
order to turn what, objectively, was an objective impossibility into a subjective impossibility. Not only 
was this immensely complex, Lundstedt pointed out, but it was hard to see how this flowed from the 
wording of the relevant provision, which made no mention of subjectivity or objectivity, let alone of 
implied guarantees. 55  This pattern, Lundstedt argued, was typical of the constructions that were 
produced by legal ideology. Thus rights were defined as being absolute by legal ideology, which meant 
that notions of the “abuse of rights” had to be invented to deal with the fact that the rights so defined 
were too broad. Similarly, the liability to pay compensation was treated by legal ideology as being 
grounded in the notion of “fault,” so that notions of “objective” duty and “objective” responsibility had 
to be invented to deal with the narrowness of a true conception of fault.56 The result was to turn legal 
theory into a seething mass of contradictory principles, which were hard to reconcile.57 
More fundamentally, however, Lundstedt also appears to have believed that legal ideology 
represents a form of special pleading. Ideology, Lundstedt argued, can serve the interest of specific 
sections of society rather than society itself. This is because, in the ultimate analysis, it is the 
underlying realities that are dispositive, not the ideological layer superimposed on them. Rights are 
only real to the extent that they reflect the outcomes produced by the operation of the legal system; 
detached from that context, they are claims or arguments as to what that system should look like. 
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This explains why rights-based arguments can conceal pragmatic approaches beneath the surface 
of the formalist and philosophical language in which they are typically couched.58 Claims couched in 
the language of “rights,” “duties,” “responsibility” or the other concepts that are the basic currency of 
legal theory represent what modern institutional theory might refer to as “institutional strategies” – that 
is, attempts to define certain practices as representing the “normal” or “correct” process by which an 
institution (in this case, the judiciary) functions, thus claiming for those practices a value that goes 
beyond their basic technical utility. 59 The aim of institutional strategies is to manage the structure of 
rules and standards governing conduct so as to create more favourable grounds for achieving ends in 
relation to governance the actor sees as desirable. If a strategy is successfully entrenched, it simply 
becomes part of the institutional environment, so that the outcomes it produces are now seen as being 
‘normal’, thus drawing attention away from its genealogy and the interests it actually advances. 
Arguments as to “rights” and “duties” are, in these terms, clear examples of attempts to entrench 
certain institutional strategies. Lundstedt’s point, therefore, in essence amounts to the claim that 
uncritically accepting rights-based arguments, without asking whose interests they entrench, will over 
time erode the law’s ability to function, as its commands lose their legitimacy. Looking beyond the 
terms of the arguments by examining the institutional outcomes they produce, in contrast, shows them 
for what they are – practices whose origins lie in special pleading by interest groups, whose effect is to 
subvert the proper operation of the institution – and enable the creation of a more constructive 
jurisprudence.60 Depicting the reality of the legal system requires jurists to look beyond these artificial 
constructs to the social realities that lie behind them, and the social benefits the law is created to 
promote. 
 
 
G. CONCLUSION: POLICY, PRINCIPLE AND LEGISLATION 
 
There is much in Lundstedt’s approach that distinguishes it from modern projects to frame an objective 
basis for law and which should thus be of general interest. However, his theory has two specific – and 
closely related – features that should make it of particular substantive interest to modern theorists. 
Firstly, Lundstedt’s acceptance of both ontological and methodological naturalism gives 
particular relevance to his approach, in as much as it suggests that insights from other disciplines can 
be used to shed light upon complex questions of interpretation in a manner that is more objective and 
grounded than those which legal theory customarily uses, without sacrificing the disciplinary autonomy 
or distinctiveness of law, something that has been a recurrent theme in anti-realist writing. Of particular 
relevance here is Lundstedt’s analysis of the law’s “social function,” his defence of its objectivity and 
his exploration of its link to social values, political programs, and what he called the “common sense of 
justice,” all of which he placed within a mutually reinforcing feedback loop. 
This represents a fundamental break with conventional legal theory, challenging the 
methodological individualism on which it is based. Not surprisingly, the sharpest critics of Lundstedt 
repeatedly ended up arguing for the inclusion of concepts such as rights that are strongly associated 
with methodological individualism. This is a striking feature of Ingemar Hedenius’s critique, discussed 
above, but arguably is most strongly seen in the debate between Lundstedt and Björling, which was 
provoked by Lundstedt’s critique of the interpretation of the Swedish Law of Sales. Lundstedt might 
well be right about the desirability of the law taking account of social needs, Björling said, but how 
were the limits of the law to be determined? This, he argued, would require engagement with rights and 
their proper place.61 Yet this fails to engage with the heart of Lundstedt’s critique, which is that rights 
cannot answer the question of where the limits of the law lie, because rights are not self-limiting, so 
that an argument based on rights will necessarily fall to special pleading. Only an approach that looks 
beyond internal fit – and, thus, which considers the institutional character and social function of law – 
can make sense of the nature of law and legal knowledge. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Lundstedt argued that any question of interpretation can be 
objectively approached with reference to the social function of the provision in question. Similarly, the 
aims of existing or proposed legislation can be objectively questioned by analysing whether its 
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provisions actually effectively discharge the social function of that aspect of the legal system. These 
aspects of his theory must be seen as being targeted not only at lawmakers but also at jurists, and as 
representing a way for jurists to maintain scholarly objectivity while avoiding being entangled in the 
charged political terms in which contentious questions on the interpretation and critical evaluation of 
legislation, whether existing and proposed, are typically debated.  
The importance of these insights is far-reaching. One of the more strident debates in recent years 
has been over the place of “policy” in adjudication. Is it permissible for judges to decide cases on 
policy grounds? What are the limits of “policy”? A major factor behind the discomfort with the idea of 
judges deciding cases on the basis of “policy” is the identification of policy with political ideology. 
Yet, as Lundstedt’s work demonstrates, questions are not in and of themselves any more or less 
political or ideological. It is the manner in which we choose to conceive of them or answer them that 
makes them so. Or, to put it in Hägerströmian terms, the properties that we term “political” or 
“ideological” are not properties of – and do not affect – the thing itself. They are properties of – and 
merely affect – our conception of the thing. What makes certain legal questions seem political is the 
fact that they are phrased in terms of legal ideology. This of its nature emphasises the conflicting 
interests involved, and conceals the operative ideas that underlie them, namely, the social outcomes 
that each possible outcome would promote, and the manner and extent to which each contributes to the 
social usefulness of the law. 
This was the position Lundstedt attacked. The problem, he argued, lies in the concepts in which 
legal theorists reason, and the manner in which they attribute content to those concepts. As long as 
legal ideology continues to dominate jurisprudence, and as long as the institutional strategies that flow 
from legal ideology continue to dominate the structures of judicial decision-making, we will continue 
to see political decisions. The point of Lundstedt’s critique was to try and move the legal system 
beyond this. This is something that can only be achieved by a proper, open-minded study of the nature 
and function of the process that creates the law and the process and thought-style by which these newly 
created laws are integrated into a legal system. The Hägerström-Lundstedt variant of Scandinavian 
realism thus offers a far more promising starting point for the analysis of modern legal systems than 
does American realism, because it explains what, precisely, is missing in current theories that leaves 
them unable to deal with these questions, and supplies the tools we need to incorporate these into our 
theories of legislation. 
